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COMMERCIAL LAW: Creditor and Debtor Rights
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, Kimura v. Wauford.

I. INTRODUCTION
In Kimura v. Wauford,' the New Mexico Supreme Court held that upon
a debtor's default, a secured creditor has the right to repossess collateral
and sue the debtor on the contract for the full amount owed. Although
the creditor must ultimately sell the collateral and reduce the debt with
the proceeds of the sale, repossession for the purpose of preserving the
collateral is not an election to accept the collateral in satisfaction of the
debt.2 In this case of first impression, 3 the Kimura court allowed the
creditor to retain possession of the collateral for more than three years
after default while the suit on the loan agreement was progressing through
the courts. The Kimura decision implies that a secured party after repossession has no duty to dispose of the property until after a final determination of the lawsuit on the underlying debt.
The court's holding in Kimura expands the rights of secured parties
and effectively eliminates the repossessing party's duty to dispose of
collateral within a reasonable time. This Note will examine whether the
holding is consistent with the applicable provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code,4 and will suggest that the court's narrow focus in Kimura
overlooked a broader issue raised by the case, namely, the conflicting
interests of the creditor and debtor after default. The Note will also discuss
Kimura's inconsistency with prior New Mexico case law. Finally, the
Note will address potential difficulties that might arise should the Kimura
holding be applied to other disputes.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In September 1982, Joe Wauford agreed to purchase a drive-in restaurant from Tom Kimura, Mary Kimura, and Kay Taira (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Kimura"). 5 The sales agreement required a cash
1. 104 N.M. 3, 715 P.2d 451 (1986).
2. Id.at 6, 715 P.2d at 454.
3. Id.
4. New Mexico originally adopted the Uniform Commercial Code in 1953, and has adopted
official amendments to the U.C.C. with few variations. The U.C.C. section numbers are preserved
under the New Mexico statutes, except that all section numbers are preceded by 55-. Codification
of the commercial law under the U.C.C. was intended to provide consistent rational law in one
comprehensive body. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-1-102(2)(c) (Cum. Supp. 1986).
5. Kimura, 104 N.M. at 4, 715 P.2d at 452.
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downpayment and a promissory note for the balance of the price. 6 The
sellers retained a security interest in the building and restaurant equipment
as collateral for the note.7
Five months later, Wauford ceased doing business at the restaurant,
defaulted on the contract, and deserted the premises, leaving the building
unprotected.' In April 1983, Kimura took possession of the property,
changed the locks, and prepared the business for re-sale or lease. 9 While
in possession of the property, Kimura initiated suit against Wauford to
recover a money judgment on the note.' 0 The trial court awarded Kimura
full recovery for the amount due."
At the trial, and upon appeal,' 2 Wauford argued unsuccessfully that
after default Kimura had to choose either to repossess the collateral or
sue for the outstanding debt. Wauford asserted that Kimura's taking possession of the collateral prior to initiating suit constituted an election of
remedies that precluded the secured party's right to judgment on the
note. 13 The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling,
holding that the secured party had the right to retain possession of the
collateral for the purpose of preserving it during the pendancy of the suit
on the note.' 4
III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
The New Mexico Supreme Court in Kimura held that a secured party
may repossess collateral after default, and retain possession throughout
6. Id. The defendant Wauford made a downpayment of $10,000, and signed a promissory note
for $41,266.50, which was the remainder of the sale price. Id. The note carried no interest. Id.
7. Id. The restaurant was situated on real property owned by a party not in this lawsuit. Id.
Wauford assumed the lease on the real property, and the responsibility for negotiating any further
leases from the landowners. Id. The court did not distinguish between the secured party's right under
this lease and the security interest in the equipment. The court's discussion either assumes that they
are the same, which would appear to be inaccurate, or that the secured party's interests only extended
to the equipment.
8. Id. Wauford took possession of the restaurant in September 1982, and abandoned the premises
in February 1983. Id. Payments on the equipment ceased in December 1982, and plaintiffs made
repeated unsuccessful demands on Wauford before initiating suit. Id. Wauford contended that he did
not abandon the property until after the plaintiffs retook possession of the restaurant and changed
the locks. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. In their complaint, the plaintiffs demanded the full amount remaining on the promissory
note. An acceleration clause in the sales agreement allowed the plaintiffs to demand full payment
upon default of the contract. Id. at 6, 715 P.2d at 454.
i1. The trial judge awarded Kimura $37,863.90. Id. at 4, 715 P.2d at 452.
12. New Mexico rules of appellate procedure provide that the New Mexico Supreme Court has
original appellate jurisdiction for "appeals from the district courts in which one or more counts of
the complaint alleges a breach of contract or otherwise sounds in contract." SCRA 1986 Rule 12102(A)(1).
13. Kimura, 104 N.M. at 5, 715 P.2d at 453.
14. Id. at 4, 715 P.2d at 452.
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a suit on the debt. 5 According to the Kimura court, if the secured party
still has possession of the collateral when the suit is decided, the court
will award the creditor the entire amount of the outstanding loan, 6 and
will trust the secured party to ultimately dispose of the collateral. 7 The
judgment is then offset by the amount realized when the collateral is
finally sold.'" The Kimura decision is troublesome for three reasons: 1)
The debtor's right under sections 9-207, 9-504, and 9-507 of the Uniform
Commercial Code to have the debt efficiently discharged is severely
compromised; 2) the decision appears inconsistent with an earlier New
Mexico Supreme Court decision in this area;' 9 and 3) the law created by
Kimura may yield unacceptable results when applied to other factual
situations.
A. The Kimura decision and the Uniform Commercial Code.
1. The Kimura decision's effect on the debtor.
Upon default, a creditor's interest in collecting an outstanding loan is
balanced against the debtor's interest in equitably liquidating the debt
without undue hardship. In Kimura, the court failed to adequately recognize this balance,2" and primarily focused on the rights and remedies
afforded the secured party after default. 2' The decision strengthened the
secured party's ability to recover the outstanding debt by diminishing
protections afforded the debtor under the U.C.C.22
The court determined that the Uniform Commercial Code grants a
secured party the right to undertake several measures at once in an effort
to collect a loan in default.23 Although the U.C.C. allows a secured party
to both repossess collateral and sue on the loan agreement for the full
15. Id. at 6, 715 P.2d at 454.
16. Id. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's deficiency judgment for the full amount
remaining unpaid on the note, even though the creditor still had possession of the collateral. Id. at
6, 715 P.2d at 454.
17. Id. at 6-7, 715 P.2d at 454-55. The Kimura court required the secured party to eventually
sell the repossessed collateral and account to the debtor for the amount recovered. The proceeds of
the sale would be applied to the outstanding debt. Id. at 7, 715 P.2d at 455.
18. Id.
19. Clark Leasing Corp. v. White Sands Forest Prod., Inc., 87 N.M. 451, 535 P.2d 1077 (1975);
see also infra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
20. The debtor in this case did not dispute the existence or amount of the debt outstanding, nor
did he dispute the secured party's fight to repossess. Kimura, 104 N.M. at 6, 715 P.2d at 454. The
debtor's argument is entirely based on his contention that the secured party's repossession and
retention of the collateral is equivalent to an election to keep the collateral instead of collecting the
debt. Id. at 5, 715 P.2d at 453. The particular facts of the case therefore squarely raised the question
of the extent to which the secured party is entitled to control the debt collection process. See infra
note 39.
21. Kimura, 104 N.M. 6, 715 P.2d at 454.
22. See also infra note 64 and accompanying text.
23. Kimura, 104 N.M. at 6, 715 P.2d at 454.
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value of the debt owed,24 generally the U.C.C. compels the secured party
to insure that the collateral is sold a reasonable time after repossession.5
Because the debtor in Kimura abandoned the collateral, the court allowed
the creditor to repossess and retain possession of the collateral for three
years while the suit on the note was tried and appealed. 26 The decision
thereby alters the balance contemplated by the U.C.C. and tips the scales
in favor of the secured party. Favoring the secured party in this case
appears extreme and unnecessary.27
The Kimura court recognized a secured party's right to be assured that
collateral is not destroyed.28 By allowing the secured party to delay disposition of the collateral, however, the court ignored the debtor's countervailing interest in selling the collateral before its value depreciated.
The court's holding implies that even though the debtor lost control of
the collateral at repossession, and the secured party is responsible for
delaying the sale, the collateral's depreciation must be suffered by the
debtor.
On appeal, the debtor in default (Wauford) argued that under the U.C.C. 9
the secured party must either retain the collateral in satisfaction of the
debt or dispose of it3° and sue for the difference between the sale proceeds
and the debt. 3 The Kimura court rejected this argument and held that
section 55-9-505 was not intended to apply in this case.32 The court
reasoned that section 55-9-505(1) governs only in disputes where the
collateral is consumer goods, and the collateral in this case was equipment." In addition, under section 55-9-505(2), the secured party in pos24. In Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Marston, 29 Mich.App. 99, 185 N.W.2d 47 (1970), the Michigan
Court of Appeals commented, "[t]he existence of a security interest in no way affects the existence
of the debt. It merely provides the secured party with an immediate source of recovery in addition
to the standard remedies of an unsecured creditor." Id. at 50.
25. See also infra note 46 and accompanying text.
26. Kimura, 104 N.M. at 6, 715 P.2d at 454.
27. See also infra note 54 and accompanying text.
28. Kimura, 104 N.M. at 5, 715 P.2d at 453.
29. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-9-501 to 9-507 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
30. Under § 55-9-505 of New Mexico's adoption of the U.C.C., the secured party may repossess
and retain collateral in satisfaction of the debt. Section 55-9-505 provides in part:
(1) If the debtor has paid sixty percent of the cash price in the case of a purchase
money security interest in consumer goods or sixty percent of the loan in the case
of another security interest in consumer goods, . . . a secured party who has
taken possession of collateral must dispose of it ....
(2) In any other case involving consumer goods or any other collateral a secured
party in possession may, after default, propose to retain the collateral in satisfaction
of the obligation. Written notice of such a proposal shall be sent to the debtor ....
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-9-505 (Cum. Supp. 1986).
31. Kimura, 104 N.M. at 5, 715 P.2d at 453. The debtor argued that under the U.C.C., the
creditor had the right to either accept the collateral instead of the money owed, or to sell the collateral
and sue for the debt remaining after liquidating the collateral. Id. Because the creditor took possession
of the collateral and did nothing with it, the debtor urged the court that an election to retain the
property in satisfaction of the debt should be presumed. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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session of the collateral must notify the debtor in writing if the collateral
is to be accepted in lieu of the debt.' The secured party did not write
the debtor that the collateral would be accepted."
The court held that because § 55-9-505 was inapplicable, the secured
party was not compelled to dispose of the collateral.36 Although the debtor
relied on §55-9-505 for his argument, other theories under the U.C.C.
support his position." Whether the secured party was entitled to delay
disposition of the collateral more than three years should have been
examined in the context of the entire Code." Focusing its analysis on
§ 55-9-505 in determining whether the creditor was entitled to delay the
collateral sale, the Kimura court denied the applicability of other sections.
Part 5 of U.C.C. Article 9 codifies the rights of secured parties and
debtors upon default. Under the seven sections of part 5, the secured
creditor is allowed to repossess collateral,39 and can either sell the property
or keep the collateral in satisfaction of the debt.' The secured party must
use reasonable care in the custody and preservation of the collateral. 4
Every aspect of the secured party's disposition of the collateral, including
the method, manner, time, place and terms of the sale must be commercially reasonable. 42 The Kimura court ordered that the secured party
must be commercially reasonable in the eventual disposition of the colSee supra note 30.
Kimura, 104 N.M. at 5, 715 P.2d at 453.
Id.
See also infra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
The official comment to § 55-1-102 of the U.C.C. reads:
The [U.C.C.] should be construed in accordance with its underlying purposes
and policies. The text of each section should be read in the light of the purpose
and policy of the rule or principle in question, as also of the act as a whole .....
N.M. STAT. ANN. §55-1-102 (1978).
39. Under § 55-9-503,
"Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take possession
of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed without judicial
process if this can be done without breach of the peace or may proceed by action."
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-9-503 (Cum. Supp. 1986).
40. Section 55-9-504 reads in part:
"(I) A secured party after default may sell, lease or otherwise dispose of any or
all of the collateral in its then condition or following any commercially reasonable
preparation or processing."
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-9-504 (Cum. Supp. 1986). Under §55-9-505(2), "a secured party may, after
N.M. STAT. ANN.
default, propose to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the obligation .
§ 55-9-505(2).
41. Under § 55-9-501, a secured party in possession of collateral after default assumes the obligations imposed by § 55-9-207.
"(1) A secured party must use reasonable care in the custody and preservation
of collateral in his possession."
Id. § 55-9-207.
Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private proceedings and may be
42.
made by way of one or more contracts. Sale or other disposition may be as a unit
or in parcels and at any time and place and on any terms but every aspect of the
disposition including the method, manner, time, place and terms must be commercially reasonable.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-9-504(3).
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
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lateral." The court, however, did not apply this standard to the secured
party's conduct before the sale. The court assumed that taking possession
of abandoned collateral was commercially reasonable, and apparently did
not question whether delaying the sale of collateral for more than three
years could be a violation of the secured party's duties.
The Kimura opinion does not discuss the effect of delay upon the
defaulting debtor. A debtor loses control of the collateral upon repossession, as well as the right to sell the collateral to pay the debt. If the
collateral depreciates over time, the longer the sale is delayed, the less
likely it becomes that the eventual sale will produce enough to cover the
debt. The Code intends to protect against such needless depreciation of
collateral property, and encourage the speedy dissolution of the debt."
The Code sections that restrict the secured party's conduct lose meaning
if the creditor can delay the sale indefinitely.4 Weakening these protections has an obvious adverse effect on the debtor.
2. The Secured Party's Duty.
In contrast to the Kimura court's holding, other jurisdictions require
secured parties to sell collateral within a reasonable time after repossession. ' The Kimura opinion quoted with approval selected passages from
43. Kimura, 104 N.M. at 6, 451 P.2d at 454.
44. Section 55-9-504 imposes two requirements on the reselling creditor: (1) the creditor must
send the debtor appropriate notice, and (2) every aspect of the sale must be commercially reasonable.
N.M. STAT. ANN § 55-9-504 (Cum. Supp. 1986). The second condition is the most important to the
debtor in default, because the amount of the deficiency judgment ultimately found against him will
be inversely proportional to the the sale price of the collateral. If the price received for the collateral
is high, the amount of the debt remaining outstanding will be low, and vice versa. The "method,
manner, time, place and terms" tests of § 55-9-504(3) insure that an insufficient price, or an unreasonably low price is not recovered at the collateral sale. See White and Summers, Handbook of the
Law Under the Uniform Commercial Code, §§ 26-29 at 1109, (2nd ed. 1984).
45. The official comments to § 55-9-501 state that part five of Article 9 is an articulation of
legislative policy with respect to the rights and limitations on secured lenders. The Code attempts
to balance the lender's interests in recovering a debt with the debtor's interests in avoiding financial
ruin. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-9-501 (Cum. Supp. 1986).
46. First Nat'l Bank of Thomasboro v. Lachenmyer, 131 ll.App.3d 914, 476 N.E.2d 755 (1985).
The court held that once a secured party has repossessed collateral, the secured party's actions with
regard to the collateral must be reasonable in all respects through the date of disposition. Id. If the
secured party impairs the debtor's ability to receive fair value for the collateral, the debtor has the
right to set off the amount of the injury against the outstanding debt. F & W Welding Service Inc.
v. Pen Smith, Inc., 38 Conn.Supp. 455, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 726 (1982) (repossessing collateral,
and doing nothing with it while its value depreciates was not commercially reasonable, and the
secured party in possession could be liable to the debtor for damages); Farmers State Bank v. Ballew,
626 P.2d 337 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981) (upon repossession, the secured party assumes the good faith
duty to reasonably handle disposition, and is therefore reponsible for any losses occasioned by his
failure to comply with this requirement. Unreasonable disposition of the collateral bars a recovery
for deficiency remaining after the collateral sale); Mack Financial Corp. v. Scott, 100 Idaho 889,
606 P.2d 993 (1980) (the secured party's unexplained failure to dispose of repossessed collateral for
more than two years was held commercially unreasonable, and such conduct by the secured party
raised the presumption that the price eventually recovered for the collateral was equivalent to the
debt); Haufler v. Ardinger, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 893 (Mass. App. 1979) (the secured party's
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cases decided in other jurisdictions, but the court did not entirely adopt
the authorities' reasoning.4" Why the Kimura court's conclusions deviated
from the holdings in these foreign jurisdictions is unclear.
One approach to the conflict between creditor and debtor rights after
default is to require the secured party to dispose of the repossessed collateral as soon as practicable. 48 Requiring a timely sale of the collateral
imposes no undue burden on the secured party. Either before bringing
suit on the note, or while the suit is pending, an appropriate sale could
prolonged retention of collateral prior to disposition constituted an election to retain the collateral
in satisfaction of the debt, which served to cancel the debtor's outstanding obligation); Shultz v.
Delaware Trust Co., 360 A.2d 576 (Del. Super. Ct. 1976) (there must be a reasonable limit to the
length of time a secured party is permitted to hold collateral before it is deemed to have exercised
its right to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the debt); Moran v. Holman, 514 P.2d 817 (Alaska
1973) (the secured party who delays disposition of the collateral an inordinate period of time may
forfeit the right to a deficiency. Especially when the collateral depreciates in value while in the
secured party's custody, the debtor may validly claim his obligation is satisfied even without notice);
Dynalectron Corp. v. Jack Richards Aircraft Co., 337 F.Supp. 659 (W.D. Okla. 1972) (the holder
of a security interest is not entitled to a deficiency judgment if the collateral, after repossession, is
not diposed of in a commercially reasonable manner. The secured party owes the debtor a duty to
use due diligence to recover the highest price possible for the repossessed collateral); Harris v.
Bower, 266 Md. 579, 295 A.2d 870 (1972) (the court held that when a secured party made no
attempt to sell the repossessed collateral and allowed it to depreciate for two years, the debtor was
credited with fair market value of the collateral at repossession, and the creditor suffered losses
caused by depreciation); Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Marston, 29 Mich. App. 99, 185 N.W.2d 47 (1971)
(the court found it unfair to allow the secured party to repossess unless with the intent to dispose
of the collateral. A secured party unwilling or unable to sell the collateral was obligated to return
the property to the debtor, subject still to the creditor's claim. But if a debtor is injured by the
secured party's inaction towards the collateral, the debtor has a right of recovery, and when the
secured party delays the sale of depreciating collateral, the debtor could validly claim his obligation
is satisfied); Bradford v. Lindsey Chevrolet, 117 Ga. App. 781, 161 S.E.2d 904 (1968). (The secured
party's retention of collateral for more than sixteen months before a sale, without an excuse for the
delay, constituted the secured party's acceptance of the collateral in lieu of the debtor's outstanding
obligation.)
47. The court cites Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Marston, 29 Mich.App. 99, 185 N.W.2d 47 (1971),
for the proposition that the secured party is not required under the U.C.C. to elect remedies, but
may pursue several at once. But in contrast to the Kimura holding, the Marston court clearly created
a duty on the part of the secured party to protect the collateral from depreciation: "To the extent
the creditor's inaction [in disposing of the collateral] results in injury to the debtor, the debtor has
a right of recovery." Id. at 5 I.
Similarly, the Kimura court quoted from Moran v. Holman, 514 P.2d 817 (Alaska 1973), in
explaining the debtor's responsibility for payments on the real estate lease. The Moran court specifically addressed the issue of the secured party's delay in disposing of repossessed collateral, and
held that when the collateral is a depreciating asset,
[tihe secured party who has retaken possession of the collateral should not be
permitted to wait an inordinate period ... and then elect to sue for the full
amount of the debt. . . . When [the secured party] retains collateral which depreciates in value . . . for an unduly long period of time, . . . the debtor may validly
claim that his obligation has been satisfied. To rule otherwise would permit
overreaching and inequitable abuses by some secured parties.
Id. at 820-21.
48. Collateral such as certificates of deposit, bonds and securities that appreciate over time may
require the secured party to weigh the present value of the collateral with its scheduled gains before
liquidating, but consumer goods and equipment that generally depreciate should be disposed of as
quickly as possible.
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begin the process of debt liquidation. Any expenses incurred by the
secured party -in preparing for the sale would be repaid from the proceeds
of the disposition. 49 If sale occurs before the suit on the note is commenced, the action would be for a deficiency judgment if the proceeds
of the sale did not cover the debt.50 If the collateral is sold after suit has
commenced, the suit would be on the note, but the damages would be
reduced by the net amount that the secured party realized at the sale. In
either situation, the secured party clearly would be acting in accordance
with the "commercial reasonableness" standard of §55-9-504(3)."' A
requirement that timely sale of the collateral be made does not restrict a
secured party's choices of remedies under §55-9-501. 52 The right to either
sue on the note or recov~r a deficiency judgment after selling the collateral
is not affected, and the requirement protects the defaulting debtor by
insuring that the goods are not allowed to depreciate in value during the
debt collection process.
In Kimura, the court did not explain why a three year delay should be
allowed, but simply held that the secured party in this case was entitled
to take possession of the collateral and hold it "for the purpose of preserving it"."' Even when collateral has been abandoned, if the sale is
required within a reasonable time, the debtor is afforded protections at
no cost to the secured party. Such a policy is consistent
5 4 with the Code's
requirement that remedies be exercised in good faith.
B. The Kimura Decision's Inconsistency With PriorNew Mexico Case
Law.
1. New Mexico Precedent.
In Clark Leasing Corp. v. White Sands Forest Prod., Inc.55 the New
49. Section 55-9-504 provides:
(1) . . . The proceeds of disposition shall be applied to . . . (a) the reasonable
the
expenses of taking, holding, preparing for sale, selling and the like and ....
reasonable attorneys' fees and legal expenses incurred by the secured party.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-9-504(1) (Cum. Supp. 1986).
50. Section 55-9-504(2) provides that the debtor is liable for any deficiency remaining if the
proceeds from the collateral sale do not cover the debt. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-9-504(2) (Cum.
Supp. 1986).
5 I. See also supra note 42 and accompanying text.
52. Section 55-9-501 provides the secured party the right to "reduce his claim to judgment,
foreclose, or otherwise enforce the security interest by any available judicial procedure .... The
rights and remedies .. . are cumulative." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-9-501 (Cum. Supp. 1986).
53. Kimura, 104 N.M. at 6, 715 P.2d at 454.
54. Under § 55-1-203, "[e]very contract or duty within [the U.C.C.] imposes an obligation of
good faith in performance or enforcement." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-1-203 (Cum.Supp. 1986).
55. 87 N.M. 451, 535 P.2d 1077 (1975).
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Mexico Supreme Court considered " . . . for the first time in New Mexico, the question whether or not a secured creditor is absolutely precluded
from recovering a deficiency judgment under the U.C.C. if he fails to
dispose of repossessed collateral as required under [55-]9-504(3). "56 The
court held in Clark Leasing that a secured party was entitled under the
U.C.C. to both repossess collateral and sue for a deficiency judgment,
but that the secured party after repossessing collateral owed a" . . . good
faith duty to the debtor to use reasonable means to see that a reasonable
price is received for the collateral." 57
The Clark Leasing court held that if the commercial reasonableness of
the collateral disposition becomes an issue, the burden falls on the secured
party to show compliance with § 55-9-504(3).58 Every aspect of the secured
party's management of the collateral sale would be examined. Specifically
the court noted that it would look to the business community to find how
goods like those repossessed are normally sold. " The secured party's
delay in holding an appropriate sale, the collateral's depreciation during
the delay, and even the price obtained at the sale were relevant under
Clark Leasing to test the commercial reasonableness of the sale." Furthermore, when a secured party does not conduct a commercially reasonable disposition of the collateral, there is a presumption that the resale
value of the collateral is equal to the value of the outstanding debt.6 This
presumption can be rebutted only if the secured party proves that the
amount of the judgment on the note exceeded what the collateral would
have brought if sold a reasonable time after repossession."
Although the Kimura case involves a similar conflict between a debtor
in default and a secured creditor, the Kimura court deviated substantially
from Clark Leasing without explaining why. Inexplicably, the court did
not even refer to the prior case.' Awarding a full deficiency judgment to
the secured party before the collateral was sold, the Kimura court apparently assumed that the eventual sale of the collateral would be commer56. Id. at 455, 535 P.2d at 1081.
57. Id. at 454, 535 P.2d at 1080.
58. Id. at 456, 535 P.2d at 1082.
59. Clark Leasing, 87 N.M. at 455, 535 P.2d at 1081.
60. Id. at 454-55, 535 P.2d at 1080-81.
61. Id. at 456, 535 P.2d at 1082.
62. Id.
63. Although the Kimura court refers to the instant case as one of first impression, the opinion
does not state what it considers to be the new issue before the court. Kimura, 104 N.M. at 6, 715
P.2d at 454. Although the debtor's abandonment of the collateral clearly has an effect on the rights
of the parties after default, the Kimura court did not expressly articulate this as its rationale for
deviating from prior law. Thus, the Kimura decision's effect on the Clark Leasing decision is unclear.
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cially reasonable, and did not consider the possible deleterious effects
the ruling may have on the debtor."
2. A Possible Reconciliation of Kimura and Clark Leasing.
a. Creating an exception to Clark Leasing v. White Sands.
A holding consistent with Clark Leasing could require that the debtor
be credited with the value of the collateral a reasonable time after repossession, except where a debtor abandons collateral. When collateral
has been abandoned, the debtor would have the burden of proving the
collateral's worth when it was repossessed. If the deserting debtor is
unable to prove otherwise, the amount recovered at the eventual sale
could be presumed to be the collateral's value at the time repossessed.
By shifting the burden of proving the collateral's value from the secured
party to the debtor, the court's decision in Kimura can be explained
without disturbing the approach of Clark Leasing.
Such an exception to Clark Leasing would protect the secured party
where the property is abandoned without confusing or redefining the law.
The Kimura court may have intended to create such an exception to Clark
Leasing, but nowhere in the opinion is this stated.
b. Recognizing the debtor's obligation to object.
Another path the court could have taken to reach the same result in
Kimura would have been to rely on those sections of the U.C.C. that
specifically provide for debtor protection. Sections 55-9-507(1) and 559-207(2) establish causes of action against the creditor when the collateral
after repossession is mishandled. 65 Under §55-9-507(1) disposition of the
collateral may be ordered by the court, and under §55-9-207(3) the
64. The conflict between Kimura and Clhrk Leasing lies in the two courts' differing applications
of the U.C.C.'s requirement that disposition of the collateral be commercially reasonable. Clark
Leasing imposes obligations on the secured party from the moment of repossession, and implies
that a secured party in possession of collateral who delays disposition may forfeit the right to recover
anything more than the proceeds of the eventual collateral sale. Under Kimura, the secured party
is allowed to repossess the collateral, and pursue a money judgment obligated only to dispose of
the collateral some time in the future and subtract the proceeds from the judgment amount. In
Kimura, the court held that only the eventual sale of the collateral will be subject to a test for
commercial reasonableness, and effectively freed the secured creditor from proving compliance with
§ 55-9-504 while holding the collateral for three years.
65. Section 55-9-507 provides the debtor with remedies against a secured party who violates its
obligations under the Code:
"(1) If it is established that the secured party is not proceeding in accordance
with the provisions of [the Code] disposition may be ordered or restrained on
appropriate terms and conditions."
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-9-507 (Cum. Supp. 1986). Under § 55-9-207(3),
[a] secured party is liable for any loss caused by his failure to [use reasonable
care in the custody and preservation of the collateral].
Id. § 55-9-207(3).
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secured party is liable to the debtor for failing to use reasonable care in
the custody and preservation of collateral. The court could have held that
§ 55-9-507 implicitly gives the debtor the right to force an equitable
disposition of the collateral and thereby protect his assets, and that the
debtor who does not avail himself of §55-9-507 protections forfeits his
claim to any damages suffered because of the creditor's delay. Absent a
§55-9-507 claim, the court could hold that it should not restrict or require
a sale, or award the debtor damages independently of the statute.
The Kimura court determined that secured parties in possession of the
collateral are subject to Section 55-9-207.' Under §55-9-207 a creditor
is responsible for maintaining the collateral, and must pay damages if
negligent in discharging this duty. Another approach to the resolution of
the Clark Leasing and Kimura results might have been for the court to
hold that §55-9-207 provides the debtor with exclusive remedies, and
because the debtor in this case did not raise an appropriate claim, any
loss the debtor suffered could not be recovered. Establishing an obligation
in the debtor to object raises additional troublesome questions,67 but it
would have allowed the Kimura court to stay within the holding of Clark
Leasing. These arguments, however, are not raised in the opinion.
c. Implications of the Kimura holding.
The secured party's right under Kimura to keep possession of the
collateral during the pendancy of the lawsuit is tantamount to a right to
attach the goods at the commencement of the suit.' New Mexico sta66. Kimura, 104 N.M. at 6, 715 P.2d at 454.
67. The difficulty with these arguments is that the debtor in default is not likely to be able to
afford to initiate an independant action asking for relief. Requiring the secured party to responsibly
dispose of the collateral within a reasonable time imposes a minimal burden, and the debtor's failure
to file a § 55-9-507 or § 55-9-207 claim should not exonerate a secured party who has kept the
collateral an unreasonable period of time without selling it. As the Alaska Supreme Court commented,
[A] debtor who has defaulted on his obligation so that the collateral has been
repossessed is often in a particularly disadvantageous position to sue the creditor
to compel disposition of the collateral or to seek damages for its misuse. Usually,
due to his poor financial position, the debtor has scant prospect of obtaining an
attorney, and the amount involved is often too small to justify legal services. The
possible remedies are thus illusory in most cases. On the other hand, no substantial
burden is imposed upon the creditor by requiring him to take action within a
reasonable time ....
Moran v. Holman, 514 P.2d 817, 820 (Alaska 1973).
68. Writs of attachment are court orders that property be seized pending the outcome of a dispute.
Staab v. Hersch, 3 N.M. 209, 3 P. 248 (1884). While the main objective in attachment was formerly
to coerce the defendant to appear in court for a trial, today the writ is used to provide the creditor
security. In the event that the creditor wins a favorable judgment on the suit, the judgment can be
enforced by liquidating the attached property.
In Kimura, the court held that the secured party is entitled to retain possession of the collateral
until the suit on the note is terminated by the appeal. Thus, the secured party's right under Kimura
is similar to attachment.
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tutorily reserves the power to attach property to a limited number of
situations.69 Generally, attachment is an extraordinary measure7' used only
when the court decides that a creditor's claim is legitimate, and that there
is a high likelihood that the debtor will attempt to avoid paying an adverse
judgment. 7 ' Under the New Mexico statute, a creditor seeking attachment
is required to file a complaint along with an affidavit that the debt is
legally owed, and a bond in an amount sufficient to cover the debtor's
expenses should the debtor prevail in the lawsuit. 72 The debtor must be
given the opportunity to contest the attachment.7 3 Although recent United
States Supreme Court decisions have questioned whether the Constitution
entitles a debtor to notice and a hearing,7" the New Mexico statute clearly
intends to protect debtors from overreaching creditors."
The Kimura decision might be construed as allowing a secured party
to attach a debtor's property after default using strictures of the New
Mexico attachment statute. By allowing a secured party to repossess and
hold on to collateral until after the debt is determined in court, the case
may present a constitutional conflict. Although the Supreme Court has
indicated that peaceful repossession is not state action, and is therefore
not governed by the Fourteenth Amendment,76 repossession followed by
the right to keep the goods for an extended period of time while pursuing
STAT. ANN. § 42-9-1 allows attachment only in one of the following situations:
when the debtor is not a resident of New Mexico,
when the debtor refuses to accept service of process,
when the debtor intends to remove his property from the state, or intends to defraud
or delay the proceedings,
d) when the debtor is preparing to fraudulently convey or sell his property so as to
defraud or hinder his creditors,
e) when the debtor has moved his property to New Mexico with the intent to defraud
his creditors elsewhere,
f) when the debtor is an out of state corporation and has no agent in New Mexico
to accept service of process,
g) when the debtor has fraudulently contracted the debt,
h) when the debt is for services, work or labor,
i) when the debt was incurred for the necessities of life.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42-9-1 (1978).
70. Martinez v. Martinez, 2 N.M. 464 (1883).
71. Staab v. Hersch, 3 N.M. 209, 3 P. 248 (1884).
72. N.M. STAT. ANN. §42-9-4 (1978).
73. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-9-17 and 42-9-18 (1978).
74. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
75. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-9-1 through 42-9-39 (1978) govern the law of attachment. In addition
to requiring a creditor to post a bond, the statute provides the debtor with the opportunity to dispute
the allegations of the affidavit and complaint and allows a trial on the appropriateness of the
attachment. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42-9-31 (1978). Both parties are entitled to appeal before the property
is seized. Id.
76. Flagg Bros. Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).

69. N.M.
a)
b)
c)
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a deficiency judgment may deprive the debtor of property without due
process of law.77
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the Kimura decision is its implication that a debtor in default may have to defend a creditor's lawsuit
for a debt while being denied possession of the collateral. In Kimura the
debtor did not contest the amount owed, 78 but if he had disputed the debt,
the lawsuit on the note would have run for more than three years while
the creditor retained possession of the subject collateral." A debtor who
is unable to make required payments on a secured loan has the option of
liquidating the collateral and using the proceeds to pay the debt. But a
debtor loses this repayment possibility when the collateral is repossessed.
When the collateral is the equipment or inventory that provides the debtor
income, payment of the debt becomes increasingly difficult when the
creditor seizes the collateral, because it deprives the debtor the means to
earn money.80 The court in Kimura could not have intended to grant the
secured party such broad powers at the debtor's expense, but such a result
would not be inconsistent with the broad language of the opinion.
IV. CONCLUSION
In holding that a secured party has no obligation to dispose of repossessed collateral while suing to collect a delinquent loan, the court in
Kimura v. Wauford disregarded the spirit of Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, and ignored a previous New Mexico decision that
clearly had bearing on the issue. 8 ' The court may have intended to distinguish Kimura from similar cases by holding that a debtor who abandons
collateral upon default also abandons the right under § 55-9-504 to a
commercially reasonable disposition of the property. If this was the court's
intent, however, it is not articulated in the opinion.
The Kimura case squarely presented the conflict between creditor and
77. The debtor in Kimura abandoned the collateral and therefore may have lost all claim to the
property. But the court's decision does not limit itself to these facts, and it is conceivable that under
Kimura, a debtor in default may effectively be deprived of his property, and be forced to suffer loss
without an opportunity to be heard.
78. Kimura, 104 N.M. at 6, 715 P.2d at 454.
79. Under the law of attachment the debtor has the right to post a bond sufficient to cover the
debt, and thereby retain possession of the collateral while defending the creditor's suit. N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 42-9-30 (1978). The Kimura decision implies that by operation of § 55-9-501 a debtor may
have to defend suit on the debt with no similar right to the collateral.
80. Indeed, one of the cases cited by the court in Kimura points out that: "For during the period
that the debtor is deprived of possession [of the collateral] he may have been able to make profitable
use of the asset or may have gone to far greater lengths than the creditor to sell." Mich. Nat'l Bank,
29 Mich. App. 99, 103, 185 N.W.2d 47, 51.
81. Clark Leasing Corp. v. White Sands Forest Prod., Inc., 87 N.M. 451, 535 P.2d 1077 (1975).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 18

debtor interests in resolving the debt after default. Although the court
may not have intended to significantly affect the balance of these conflicting interests, the court resolved the dispute by enhancing the secured
party's power. In weakening the debtor's protections afforded through
Article 9 of the U.C.C., Clark Leasing and the law of attachment,8" the
decision in Kimura leaves New Mexico law in the area unclear. Failing
to fully explain the rationale of its decision, the court also failed to develop
the commercial law of New Mexico.
F. MICHAEL HART

82. See also supra notes 60-75 and accompanying text.

